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OddzOn Products and Derivation of 
Invention:  At Odds with the Purpose of 
Section 102(f) of the Patent Act of 1952? 
529 
Brian P. Murphy* 
INTRODUCTION 
In OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,1 the Federal Cir-
cuit ruled that non-public subject matter derived from another pur-
suant to section 102(f) of title 35 of the United States Code2 may 
be used against the patentee as prior art for purposes of an obvi-
ousness determination under section 103.3  Judge Lourie, acknowl-
edging contrary authority, explained the ruling by stating that the 
court felt constrained by the language of the 1984 amendments to 
section 103, and the legislative history in support thereof.4  While a 
 
* Managing Partner, Hopgood, Calimafde, Kalil & Judlowe, LLP, New York, NY.  
University of Virginia, B.A. Chem. 1982; Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1985.  
The views expressed in this Essay are those solely of the author and are not to be attrib-
uted to the firm of Hopgood, Calimafde, Kalil & Judlowe, LLP or any of its clients. 
1. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
2. The Patent Act was enacted as the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 
Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994)).  The subject matter did not 
fall within any of the provisions of section 102(a) through (e), or (g).  See 35 U.S.C. § 
102(a)-(e), (g).  Section 102 states the “Conditions for patentability.”  Id.  Subsections 
(a)-(e), and (g) describe exceptions to entitlement for patentability.  See id. 
3. See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
4. See id.  (“It is historically very clear that this provision was intended to avoid the 
invalidation of patents under §103 on the basis of the work of fellow employees engaged 
in team research.”); see Section–by-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments Act of 
1984, 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833 (stat-
ing that the amendment, which encourages communication among members of research 
teams, was a response to In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973) and In re Clemens, 
622 F.2d 1029, 1040 (C.C.P.A. 1980), in which “an earlier invention which is not public 
may be treated under Section 102(g), and possibly under 102(f), as prior art with respect 
to a later invention made by another employee of the same organization.”).  There was no 
clear purpose to Congress’s inclusion of section 102(f) in the amendment other than an 
attempt to ameliorate the problems of patenting the results of team research.  Neverthe-
less, the language appears in the statute, it was enacted by Congress, and therefore must 
be given effect. 
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federal court must give effect to statutory language and defer to the 
expressed intent of Congress, the court’s ruling in OddzOn Prod-
ucts contravenes the purpose of section 102(f) and the policy be-
hind its enactment. 
Section 102(f) requires originality of invention of the subject 
matter sought to be patented.5  While the section defines a re-
quirement for patentability; section 102(f) does not define prior art 
for purposes of section 103.6  In a case such as OddzOn Products, 
where a patentee learns of an idea from another who has not filed a 
patent application or otherwise published the idea, and the patentee 
improves upon the idea or is “inspired” by it, the unpublished idea 
should not be used as prior art in making a determination of obvi-
ousness under section 103. 
An alternate analysis would require a determination of whether 
inventorship was joint and should be corrected under section 256,7 
rather than granting the derived idea “prior art” status under sec-
tion 103.  Thus, what otherwise would be a patentable invention 
remains a patentable invention unless there was “deceptive in-
tent[]” in failing to name a joint inventor on the original applica-
tion.8  That solution promotes the progress of science and the use-
ful arts by granting inventors exclusive rights to their respective 
inventions, while allowing the public to benefit from the disclosure 
of an invention that might not otherwise have come to light.9 
 
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994) (stating that unless the applicant failed to invent 
the “subject matter” for which he seeks a patent, that applicant is “entitled to a patent”). 
6. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also Lamb-Weston, 
Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, dissenting); 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994) (permitting correction of the designated inventorship 
of a patent when an error was made without deceptive intent). 
8. Id.  The Commissioner of Patents may issue a certificate of correction where, ab-
sent “deceptive intention” on the part of a person “named . . . as the inventor,” a patent is 
issued: (1) to an incorrectly identified inventor or (2) without naming an inventor.  Id.;  
see, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stark v. 
Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that absent de-
ceptive intention, the Commissioner may correct such an error at any time). 
9. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego and Tapematic, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 
1995).  The court stated: 
The patentee is deriving proper economic return on its investment in acquiring 
a patent right.  The public benefits from the disclosure of the invention and the 
ability to exploit it when the patent term expires.  As the Supreme Court noted: 
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This Essay argues that the 1984 amendments to section 103 in-
correctly referenced section 102(f) as “prior art” for determining 
obviousness under section 103.  As an alternative to its strict statu-
tory construction of section 103(c), the court could have: (1) de-
termined whether inventorship was joint and (2) allowed correction 
under section 256.  Part I discusses the development of the deriva-
tion of invention defense that was analyzed in Oddzon Products.  
Part II reviews the Oddzon Products analysis, which formulated 
the rule that an invention may be unpatentable for obviousness un-
der section 103—even where the patentee contributed an im-
provement to a non-public idea derived from another to achieve a 
complete conception of the claimed invention.  Part III argues that 
the OddzOn rule should not be law and proposes that correction of 
inventorship under section 256 is a better way to resolve the issue 
of derivation. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DERIVATION OF  
INVENTION DEFENSE 
A. The Law Prior to the 1952 Patent Act 
The defense of “derivation of invention” has always required 
proof that the patentee derived the “complete invention” or the 
“whole idea” of the invention from another person before the 
courts would invalidate a patent.10  The theory was that it was un-
fair and a violation of “the ordinary laws that govern human con-
duct”11 to allow the patentee to benefit from what he did not do, 
consistent with the fundamental policy that the law would not 
sanction a fraudulent conversion or theft of intellectual property by 
sanctioning the fruits of such a taking.12  On the other hand, the 
 
Congress, in the choice of means of promoting the useful arts by patent grants, 
could have provided that the grant should be conditioned upon the use of the 
patented invention, as in fact it did provide by the Act of 1833 . . . .  “But Con-
gress was aware that an unpatented invention could be suppressed and the pub-
lic thus deprived of all knowledge or benefit of it.”’ 
Id. (quoting Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945)). 
10. See Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 603 (1868); see also Atlantic 
Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 205 (1883). 
11. Atlantic Works, 107 U.S. at 203. 
12. See Agawam, 74 U.S. at 597. 
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courts were leery of invalidating a patent, where an alleged first 
inventor was not diligent in pursuing the patent and bringing it into 
the public eye,13 because the diligent utilization of the patent sys-
tem and the concomitant benefit to the public was of paramount 
importance. 
B. Federico’s Commentary on the 1952 Patent Act 
P.J. Federico’s “Commentary on the New Patent Act” of 1952 
contains an illuminating discussion of the interplay between sec-
tions 102 and 103.14  Federico notes that the title of section 102 de-
scribes “[n]ovelty and other conditions for patentability,”15 an im-
mediate indication that the subsections of section 102 define more 
than just prior art for determining novelty.  Federico’s commentary 
on section 102(a) emphasizes the limitations of the novelty re-
quirement: 
The novelty required is not novelty in an absolute sense as 
the statute defines what is to be looked to in order to show 
that an invention is not new . . . . The Committee Report 
both in the general part and in the Revision Notes recog-
nizes that the interpretation of this condition is somewhat 
more restricted than the actual language, stating “the inter-
pretation by the courts excludes various kinds of private 
knowledge not known to the public,” and the narrowing in-
terpretations are not changed.16 
Thus, the reluctance of the courts to recognize “private knowl-
 
13. See id. (charging of a “fraudulently and surreptitiously obtain[ing] the patent for 
that which he well knew was invented by another, unaccompanied by the further allega-
tion that the alleged first inventor was at the time using reasonable diligence in adapting 
and perfecting the invention, is not sufficient to defeat the patent . . . .”); cf. Crown Cork 
& Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 174 (1937) (“But the arts and sci-
ences will certainly not be promoted by giving encouragement to inventors to withhold 
and conceal their inventions for an indefinite time, or to a time when they may use and 
apply their inventions to their own exclusive advantage, irrespective of the public bene-
fit . . . .”). 
14. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161 (Mar. 1993). 
15. See id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
16. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399). 
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edge” in a challenge to patent validity was explicitly recognized 
and left unchanged by Congress and the drafters of the statute. 
Federico comments that section 102(f) “is perhaps unneces-
sary,” but “it emphasizes that the inventor must be the one to apply 
for a patent.”17  He further points out that section 102(f) empha-
sizes the distinction between a true “author” of an invention and 
one who merely copies the invention from another.18  There is no 
statutory discussion of prior art or novelty in connection with sec-
tion 102(f).19 
Concerning section 103, Federico notes that this portion of the 
1952 Patent Act was entirely new but codified a requirement of 
patentability mandated by the courts for more than 100 years.20  
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report provided that “[section 
103] refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to 
be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as 
described in section 102.”21  Federico expands on this point, and 
states that “[t]he comparison is between the subject matter claimed 
to be patentable and what is disclosed or described in the available 
statutory prior art material, and it is irrelevant whether the claim-
ant knew or did not know this prior art material.”22  That comment 
could only have been made if the drafters of the statute had in-
tended to limit statutory prior art to that which was publicly avail-
able and, therefore, theoretically available to anyone and everyone 
regardless of whether the patentee actually had knowledge of it.  
Conversely, because a patentee’s actual personal knowledge of a 
prior invention by another is fundamental to section 102(f) invalid-
ity, the drafters did not appear to have intended section 102(f) to be 
considered prior art under section 103. 
 
17. See Federico, supra note 14, at 179-80. 
18. See id. at 180. 
19. But see OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (concluding that section 102(f) of title 35 is a prior art provision for purposes of 
section 103). 
20. See Federico, supra note 14, at 180. 
21. Id. at 181 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2399). 
22. Id. (emphasis added). 
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C. In re Bass and the CCPA 
In 1973, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) 
expounded on the definition of section 103 prior art in In re Bass.23  
There, the CCPA held: 
[T]he use of the prior invention of another who had not 
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it under the circum-
stances of this case which include the disclosure of such in-
vention in an issued patent, is available as ‘prior art’ within 
the meaning of that term in [section 103] by virtue of [sec-
tion 102(g)].24 
The CCPA also contrasted the circumstances of In re Bass with 
the case of Grinnell Corp. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,25 
where the district court refused to consider the prior invention of 
another as prior art under section 103 because the prior inventor 
had kept his work secret.26  Judge Rich, in the principal opinion, 
noted that Grinnell “is an example of how the ‘not . . . suppressed 
or concealed’ clause serves to prevent the use of truly ‘secret’ prior 
invention as prior art under [section 103].”27 
In response to the concurring opinion of Judge Baldwin, Judge 
Rich attacked the proposition that everything in section 102 is prior 
art.28  Judge Rich argued that the anatomy of section 102 is fairly 
 
23. 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
24. Id. at 1286-87. 
25. 277 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Va. 1967). 
26. See id. at 518-19. 
27. In re Bass, 474 F.2d at 1286. 
28. See id. at 1290.  Judge Rich stated: 
The concurrence makes the erroneous statement that in past cases we have 
based our thinking on “the proposition that everything in section 102 is prior 
art” (original emphasis).  The anatomy of § 102 is fairly clear.  As forecast in 
its heading, it deals with the two questions of “novelty and loss of right.”  It 
also deals with originality in subsection (f) which says that one who “did not 
himself invent the subject matter” (i.e., he did not originate it) has no right to a 
patent on it.  Subsections (c) on abandonment and (d) on first patenting the in-
vention abroad, before the date of the U.S. application, on an application filed 
more than a year before filing in the U.S., are loss of right provisions and in no 
way relate to prior art.  Of course, (c), (d), and (f) have no relation to § 103 and 
no relevancy to what is “prior art” under § 103.  Only the remaining portions of 
§ 102 deal with “prior art.”  Three of them, (a), (e), and (g), deal with events 
prior to applicant’s invention date and the other, (b), with events more than one 
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clear, and that the concurrence erroneously stated that in “past 
cases we have based our thinking on ‘the proposition that every-
thing in section 102 is prior art.’”29  Judge Rich noted that the 
heading of section 102 forecasts that the section deals with the two 
questions of “novelty and loss of right.”30  Section 102 “also deals 
with originality in subsection (f).”31  Subsection (f) states that the 
person who did not himself invent the subject matter has no right 
to a patent on it.32  Subsection (c) covers abandonment and subsec-
tion (d) covers the first patenting of the invention abroad, before 
the date of the United States application, on an application filed 
more than a year before filing in the United States.33  Judge Rich 
argued that these subsections are loss of right provisions, are in no 
way related to “prior art,” and that these subsections, along with 
subsection (f), have no relation to section 103 and no relevancy to 
what is “prior art” under section 103.34  Judge Rich opined that 
only the remaining portions of section 102 dealt with “prior art.”35  
Subsections (a), (e), and (g) cover events prior to an applicant’s in-
vention date, while subsection (b) covers those events that occur 
more than one year prior to the United States application date.36  
Judge Rich concluded that these subsections are the “prior art” 
subsections.37  Judge Rich’s argument is the clearest statement of 
the inapplicability of section 102(f) as prior art under section 103 
to be found in the case law.38 
 
year prior to the U.S. application date.  These are the “prior art” subsections. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d at 1290. 
33. See id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. 
38. See In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1040 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (effectively deriding a 
standard of patentability which measure’s an applicant’s contribution against “secret prior 
art.”). 
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D. The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of Derivation of Invention 
under Section 102(f) 
Judge Rich, in Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,39 
continued to emphasize that the use of “secret” art as prior art un-
der section 103 is disfavored for reasons of public policy.40  Judge 
Kashiwa issued a concurring opinion clarifying his construction 
“that the invention of another under section 102(g), to be available 
as prior art for a section 103 determination, must have been dis-
closed in an issued U.S. patent.”41  Judge Kashiwa was motivated 
by a concern that the court was unduly expanding the scope of 
prior art within the meaning of section 103.42 
Judge Kashiwa’s concern was not unwarranted.  In New Eng-
land Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co.,43 the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, refusing to overturn the district court’s rul-
ing that plaintiff was not likely to overcome the defense of deriva-
tion of invention under section 102(f).44  This decision is unre-
markable except for the declaration that a patent is invalid under 
section 102(f) if “at least so much of the claimed invention as 
would have made it obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art” is 
derived from another.45  The decision cites Agawam Co. v. Jor-
dan46 and DeGroff v. Roth47 in support of the proposition. 
Agawam consistently speaks of derivation of a “complete in-
vention” or a “complete and perfect machine” as a precondition to 
patent invalidation.48  The language in Agawam on which the New 
England Braiding court relied stands for the proposition that the 
derived idea must have been so complete as to have “enabled an 
ordinary mechanic, without the exercise of any ingenuity and spe-
 
39. 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
40. See id. at 1446. 
41. Id. at 1461 (Kashiwa, concurring). 
42. See id. 
43. 970 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
44. See id. at 884. 
45. Id. at 883. 
46. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602-03 (1868). 
47. 412 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (relying on the same language from 
the Agawam decision). 
48. Agawam, 74 U.S. at 603. 
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cial skill on his part, to construct and put the improvement in suc-
cessful operation.”49  The characterization of an ordinary mechanic 
reducing a complete conception to practice is not to be confused 
with a person of ordinary skill in the art making an obvious modi-
fication to an incomplete conception.  Agawam does not support 
the use of section 102(f) subject matter as prior art under section 
103.50 
The OddzOn Products decision also discussed Lamb-Weston, 
Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd.51  In Lamb-Weston, although the major-
ity declined to reach the issue of whether section 102(f) defines 
prior art for an obviousness determination under section 103,52 
Judge Newman dissented, chastising the majority for what she felt 
was an erroneous invocation of section 102(f) to provide the neces-
sary “motivation” for a determination of obviousness.53  Judge 
Newman outlined the rationale of In re Bass and Kimberly-Clark 
that section 102(f) is not prior art, “which is defined as actual or 
presumed public knowledge.”54  The majority merely noted con-
trary authority without discussing the merits.55 
 
49. Id. at 602-03. 
50. See Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that “New England Braiding . . . did not incorporate an obvious-
ness test into the [section 102(f)] analysis.”) 
51. 78 F.3d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
52. See id. at 544 n.1.  The court stated: 
This court [does] not reach the . . . issue of whether section 102(f) . . . defines 
prior art for an obviousness determination under section 103 [because] . . . the 
Matsler and Jayne potato slices [(the end-products of earlier inventions)] were 
separate from the machines that produced them and [thus] were not confiden-
tial. 
Id. 
53. Id. at 546. 
54. Lamb-Weston, 78 F.3d at 549. 
55. See id. 
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RULING BLESSES A NEW CATEGORY 
OF PRIOR ART FOR DETERMINING OBVIOUSNESS UNDER  
SECTION 103 
A. The Facts and Procedural History of OddzOn Products 
In OddzOn Products, the plaintiff, OddzOn Products, Inc. 
(“OddzOn”), alleged infringement of its U.S. Patent D346,001.56  
The ‘001 patent protects the ornamental features of a foam, foot-
ball-shaped ball with a tail and fin structure sold by OddzOn.57  
The defendant, Just Toys, Inc. (“Just Toys”), sold a competing 
product with similar features.58  On a motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court found that two confidential ball designs had 
been disclosed to the inventor of the OddzOn ‘001 patent and had 
“inspired” the inventor in his patented design.59  The district court 
determined that the disclosure of the confidential designs qualified 
as subject matter within the meaning of section 102(f) and could be 
combined with other prior art designs for purposes of an obvious-
ness challenge under section 103.60  The district court nonetheless 
ruled that the patented design would not have been obvious in light 
of the prior art, including the two confidential designs.61 
B. The Federal Circuit Construed Prior Art under Section 103 
to Include Non-Public Subject Matter Derived from 
Another under Section 102(f) 
On appeal, OddzOn challenged the trial court’s ruling that sec-
tion 102(f) subject matter is prior art for purposes of obviousness 
under section 103.62  Judge Lourie, writing for the court, noted that 
the issue had not been decided expressly by the Federal Circuit.63  
The court acknowledged the logical rationale for a contrary hold-
 
56. 122 F.3d 1396, 1399-1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
57. See id. at 1399. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. at 1400-01. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. at 1400. 
62. See OddzOn Prod., 122 F.3d at 1401. 
63. See id. 
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ing,64 but affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that “a fair 
reading of [section 103], as amended in 1984, leads to the conclu-
sion that [section 102(f)] is a prior art provision for purposes of 
[section 103].”65 
Judge Lourie deftly explained the prior art and loss-of-right 
subsections in section 102.  Subsections (a), (b), (e), and (g) are 
clearly prior art and “relate to knowledge manifested by acts that 
are essentially public.”66  Subsections (c) and (d), on the other 
hand, are loss-of-right provisions triggered by an inventor’s failure 
to pursue a patentable invention in a timely fashion.67  Judge 
Lourie then summarized longstanding patent law doctrine that 
“prior art” is knowledge available to the public, and he elucidated 
the policy of preferring later inventors who use the patent system 
over prior, but non-public, inventors.68 
Having cited Judge Rich’s dicta in In re Bass, to the effect that 
section 102(f) has “no relation to [section 103] and no relevancy to 
what is ‘prior art’ under [section 103],”69 Judge Lourie seemed 
poised to declare that section 102(f) subject matter is not prior art 
for purposes of section 103.  It was not to be. 
Judge Lourie, almost abruptly, quoted the language contained 
in the 1984 amendment to section 103: “[s]ubject matter developed 
by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsec-
tion (f) or (g) of section 102 . . . shall not preclude patentability 
under this section . . . .”70  While this statutory language does not 
state affirmatively that subject matter under section 102(f) is prior 
art under section 103, Judge Lourie reasoned that this conclusion is 
“inescapable” because “the language that states that [section 
102(f)] subject matter is not prior art under limited circumstances 
clearly implies that it is prior art otherwise.”71  He then attempted 
to justify the ruling, but in doing so, underscored the difficulty 
 
64. See id. at 1402. 
65. Id. at 1401. 
66. Id. at 1402. 
67. See id. 
68. OddzOn Prod., 122 F.3d at 1402. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1403 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1994)) (emphasis in original). 
71. Id. 
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with the statutory language and the construction the court felt 
compelled to announce. 
Thus, according to the rule of OddzOn Products, an invention 
may be unpatentable for obviousness under section 102(f)/section 
103, even though the patentee contributed an improvement to a 
non-public idea derived from another to achieve a complete con-
ception of the claimed invention.72 
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The holding in OddzOn Products fails to comply with the his-
torical rationale and policy behind the derivation of invention de-
fense and also cuts against the important public policy of encour-
aging inventors to use the patent system and share the benefits of 
their inventions with the public.73 
A. The Hypothetical Case of Mr. Goodidea and Mr. Patentee 
While the factual circumstances of OddzOn Products are, per-
haps, somewhat rare (at least based upon the relative dearth of re-
ported decisions under section 102(f)), the use of ideas derived 
from others occurs often enough to merit discussion.74  Suppose 
that Mr. Goodidea conceives a novel subject matter that I will call 
“A.”  For any number of reasons, such as the wish to maintain se-
crecy, or a lack of money, or interest, Mr. Goodidea does not pub-
lish, patent, or in any way publicly use or disclose subject matter 
A.  Then, perhaps through some casual conversation, an error in 
judgment, or formal discussions convened pursuant to an executed 
nondisclosure agreement, Mr. Goodidea discloses subject matter A 
to Mr. Patentee. 
Mr. Patentee is a titan of industry and inventor of some re-
nown.  He has fifty United States patents to his credit and has 
founded and successfully established two businesses built around 
his patent portfolios.  Mr. Patentee, possessing Mr. Goodidea’s 
 
72. See id. 
73. See id. at 1403-04. 
74. See id. at 1396-1401.  One commentator has noted that “[i]n one sense every 
invention is nothing but the result of new uses of old materials.”  Federico, supra note 14, 
at 177. 
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conception of subject matter A, cogitates.  He runs some experi-
ments and diligently records the results that fill ten pages in his in-
ventor’s notebook.  Mr. Patentee cogitates some more.  Finally, 
Mr. Patentee modifies and refines subject matter A, reduces the in-
vention to practice and files a patent application in his own name 
for the invention.  The patent application necessarily discloses sub-
ject matter A to comply with section 112 of title 35 of the United 
States Code.75 
Mr. Patentee immediately creates a market for the invention.  
After two years of manufacturing refinements and $20 million in 
advertising expenses, sales are a robust $100 million annually.  Mr. 
Patentee’s shareholders are ecstatic.  His customers are even hap-
pier.  Mr. Goodidea, having read about the success of the invention 
in the local newspaper, gushes with praise for Mr. Patentee: “That 
Mr. Patentee is something else.  I wish I had his drive and 
determination.” 
All is fine until Mr. Patentee’s top sales representative reports 
that a major competitor has knocked-off the invention and is grab-
bing Mr. Patentee’s market share.  Mr. Patentee’s lawyers com-
mence an action for willful patent infringement and move for a 
preliminary injunction.  Mr. Patentee, brimming with confidence 
as he enters the courtroom, leaves eight hours later a beaten man.  
District Judge Smart denied the request for a preliminary injunc-
tion.  Judge Smart found that Mr. Patentee could not establish a 
likelihood of success on the merits because, under the rule of 
OddzOn Products, subject matter A—although not a complete con-
ception of the invention—was prior art under sections 102(f) and 
103.76  Thus the patent was rendered invalid for obviousness. 
 
75. Section 112 mandates that the patent application “contain a written description 
of the invention and the manner and process of making and using it . . . .”  35 U.S.C.       
§ 112 (1994). 
76. See OddzOn Prods. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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B. Should the Rule of OddzOn Products be the Law? 
1. The Importance of Prior Art Being Publicly Available 
It bears repeating that the above hypothetical fact pattern, like 
the OddzOn Products case, assumes that Mr. Goodidea’s concep-
tion of subject matter A was non-public and not the subject of a 
patent application.  Thus, it could not be prior art under section 
102(a), (b), or (e).77  Section 102(g) might be invoked, but it is fur-
ther assumed that Mr. Goodidea abandoned, suppressed ,or con-
cealed his idea, as in OddzOn Products.78  Therefore, only section 
102(f)/section 103 is at issue.79 
Subsections (a), (b), (e), and (g) of section 102 have been read 
into the “prior art” provision of section 103 on the theory that the 
subsections all relate to knowledge that is published, or eventually 
leads to, publication.80  Thus, the policy of benefiting the public, 
through early publication and guarding against a patent grant that 
attempts to withdraw technology already in the public domain,81 is 
consistently maintained in a section 103 analysis focusing on that 
which is obvious from what could have been known by one—
anyone—of ordinary skill in the art.  That rationale does not apply 
to subject matter under 102(f) because the subject matter could not 
have been known to anyone, that is everyone, of ordinary skill—in 
our case it was known to only particular individuals, Mr. Goodidea 
and Mr. Patentee. 
 
77. Subsections (a) and (e) deal with events prior to the applicant’s invention date, 
and (b) with events more than one year prior to the application date.  These are the “prior 
art” provisions.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); see also In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (discussing the prior art provisions of section 102). 
78. In OddzOn Products, the confidential designs had been disclosed to the inven-
tor.  See OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1400-02.  Similarly, Mr. Goodidea’s idea was non-
public and disclosed only to Mr. Patentee. 
79. Subsection (f) states a person is not entitled to a patent if the inventor himself 
did not invent the subject matter.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). 
80. See OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1402; Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, 
Ltd., 78 F.3d 540, 548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1039-40 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286-87 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
81. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6, (1966); OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d 
at 1402 (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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2. Derivation of Invention Is an Equitable Defense 
The defense of derivation of invention, now codified in section 
102(f), is, and always has been, a limited exception to the rule of 
law favoring later inventors who use the patent system and publish 
their inventions over prior inventors who do not publish their in-
ventions.82  It is a personal defense grounded in equity, because the 
defense is based on personal, private knowledge.83  The courts will 
not permit a person to obtain or maintain a patent for subject mat-
ter that is wholly another’s invention.  Just as the tortious conver-
sion or criminal theft of personal property is illegal, so too is the 
conversion or theft of intellectual property.84  The key, it would 
seem, is whether there is a culpable mens rea and a taking of a 
complete conception on the part of the patentee to justify invalidat-
ing a patent. 
In the situation where a patentee takes a complete conception 
from someone else and patents it as his own, there is a clear fraud, 
evidenced by a false declaration of inventorship, and section 102(f) 
nicely fits the bill to invalidate the patent.  The culpable mens rea 
is readily apparent.  But what of Mr. Patentee and Mr. Goodidea?  
Hasn’t Mr. Patentee benefited the public by utilizing the patent 
system to publish a true invention?  Has Mr. Patentee really com-
mitted a fraud by filing a patent application reflecting his inventive 
contribution?  Are Mr. Patentee and Mr. Goodidea joint inventors 
of the invention?  If so, how can the non-public, personal knowl-
edge of Mr. Goodidea be used as prior art?85  Sections 102(f) and 
103 do not adequately address these issues. 
 
82. See Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583, 602 (1868); OddzOn Prods., 
122 F.3d at 1401-02. 
83. See Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 202-04 (1883); Agawam, 74 U.S. at 
597, 602-03. 
84. See MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at § 9.02 (3d ed. 
1998) (discussing the National Stolen Property Act and its application to personal and 
intellectual property). 
85. In a situation of true joint inventors, the prior knowledge of one of the inventors 
cannot be used as prior art.  See Shields v. Halliburton, 667 F.2d 1232, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
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3. Correction of Inventorship Analysis Is a Better Way to 
Resolve the Issue of Derivation 
Correction of inventorship provides a better way to resolve the 
issue of derivation, as provided for in section 256 of title 35.86  
Section 256 states that the Commissioner has the authority to issue 
a certificate correcting an error in an issued patent where the error 
did not arise out of any deceptive intention.87  Such error includes 
a person being named in an issued patent as the inventor or through 
error an inventor is not named in an issued patent.88  The certificate 
may be issued upon application of all the parties and assignees to 
the patent, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as 
may be imposed.89  An error whereby the inventors are omitted or 
the named person was not the inventor does not invalidate the pat-
ent if the error can be corrected pursuant to section 256.90 
A determination of proper inventorship under section 256 re-
quires two important findings: (i) an identification of the individu-
als who made an inventive contribution to the claimed invention 
and (ii) whether there was deceptive intent in the nonjoinder (or 
misjoinder) of any inventor.91  Significantly, if the omission of an 
inventor can be corrected under section 256, the statute affirma-
tively precludes a finding that the patent is invalid.92 
As applied to our fact pattern, a trier-of-fact would determine 
whether Mr. Goodidea and Mr. Patentee both made an inventive 
contribution to the claimed invention.  If the jury finds that both 
 
86. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994).  Section 256 states: 
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, 
or through error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error 
arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the Commissioner may, on 
application of all the parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such 
other requirements as may be imposed, issue a certificate correcting such error.  
The error of omitting inventors or naming persons who are not inventors shall 
not invalidate the patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as 
provided in this section . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. 
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individuals made separate inventions, Mr. Patentee retains his pat-
ent and nothing changes.  If they are found to be joint inventors,93 
inventorship will be corrected and the validity of the patent main-
tained, but only if Mr. Patentee is found to have acted without de-
ceptive intent by filing and prosecuting the patent application 
solely in his name.94  If it is decided that only Mr. Goodidea, but 
not Mr. Patentee, made an inventive contribution to the claimed 
invention, then the patent will be invalidated under section 102(f), 
because such a finding would necessarily mean that Mr. Patentee 
derived a complete conception of the claimed invention from Mr. 
Goodidea.95  Thus, there is no reason to consider subject matter de-
rived from another in accordance with section 102(f) as prior art 
under section 103. 
Employing a correction of inventorship analysis rather than an 
analysis under sections 102(f) and 103 makes sense.96  If there are 
entirely separable inventions or a joint invention with no deceptive 
intent on the part of Mr. Patentee, an otherwise patentable inven-
tion remains patentable.  Mr. Patentee has made a valid contribu-
tion to the inventive concept and has taken an idea that, but for Mr. 
Patentee’s diligence and effort, would never have been published 
or patented.  It would have remained undetected amid the rubble of 
other discarded ideas. 
 
93. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994) provides, in relevant part: 
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically 
work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or 
amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject 
matter of every claim of the patent. 
Id. 
94. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical 
Labs., Inc. 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.) (holding that a patent application was valid where it: 
(1) adequately disclosed information about the nonobvious trait of the drug cephalexin, 
and (2) where the trait was readily identifiable by persons trained in prior art), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 1014 (1980). 
95. The filing of the patent application by Mr. Patentee and publication of the patent 
however will likely preclude Mr. Goodidea from ever obtaining his own patent if he is 
determined to be the sole inventor. 
96. Both Agawam and Shields recognize the applicability of a joint inventorship 
and/or correction of inventorship analysis under similar factual circumstances.  See Aga-
wam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1868); Shields v. Halliburton, 667 F.2d 1232, 
1236 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
MURPHY.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:34 PM 
546 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:529 
Mr. Patentee should be rewarded rather than penalized because 
he has used the patent system to promote the progress of science 
for the public’s benefit without withdrawing any information from 
the public domain and without committing a fraudulent or inequi-
table taking.  Mr. Patentee’s effort is the reason the concept of sub-
ject matter A blossomed into a “useful” invention.  Equally impor-
tant, this result allows Mr. Patentee to exclude an unscrupulous 
willful infringer from the market place, rather than allowing the 
willful infringer to benefit from culpable conduct.97  Even Mr. 
Goodidea benefits from being named a joint inventor with indi-
visible rights in the patent.98 
C. The Legislative History of the 1984 Amendment to Section 
103 Does Not Provide Clear  Guidance on What Constitutes 
Prior Art under Section 103 
Judge Lourie, reflecting on the language of the 1984 amend-
ment to section 103, was correct: “[t]here was no clearly apparent 
purpose in Congress’ inclusion of section 102(f) in the amendment 
other than an attempt to ameliorate the problems of patenting the 
results of team research.”99  Certainly a reference only to section 
102(g) would have been sufficient to accomplish the purpose, but 
the inference the court draws from the statutory reference to sec-
tion 102(f) may not be so compelling.100 
The legislative comment cited by Judge Lourie acknowledges 
only the possibility that “an earlier invention which is not public 
 
97. The Court in Agawam specifically cited this possibility.  See Agawam, 74 U.S. 
at 604. 
98. Some might argue that this is not entirely fair in view of Mr. Goodidea’s failure 
to publicize his idea or use the patent system to benefit the public.  Mr. Patentee and Mr. 
Goodidea could well reach an economic solution through arm’s length bargaining to 
value Mr. Goodidea’s contribution, but even so, this potential for dispute seems a lesser 
evil than nullifying legitimate patent rights. 
99. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
100. Section 102(g) provides in part: 
[I]n determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the re-
spective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also 
the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).  Section 102(f) states in relevant part, “he did not himself in-
vent the subject matter sought to be patented.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1994). 
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may be treated under section 102(g), and possibly under 102(f), as 
prior art with respect to a later invention made by another em-
ployee of the same organization.”101  The legislative history goes 
on to emphasize that “the amendment is not intended to enable ap-
propriation of the invention of another.”102  In both cases, the word 
“invention” is used, thus implying that the prior art must be a com-
plete conception rather than only a partial idea that might lead to 
invalidity for obviousness under section 103. 
On the other hand, the legislative history states that the 
amendment to section 103 “makes clearer that information learned 
from or transmitted to persons outside the inventor’s immediate 
organization is not disqualified as prior art.”103  It seems the lim-
ited exception intended by the amendment to section 103—
promoting unencumbered communication among members of re-
search teams working in corporations, universities, or other organi-
zations—has had the unintended effect of creating a new category 
of prior art.104 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s holding in OddzOn Products, that subject 
matter under section 102(f) may be used as prior art for purposes 
of an obviousness determination under section 103, is the result of 
an inferential statutory construction that leaves room for debate.  
The legislative history is inconsistent on the point and is not 
fleshed out in any detail, and the court’s holding undermines the 
purpose of section 102(f).  The provisions of section 256, regard-
ing correction of inventorship, provide a better analytical frame-
work to resolve the issues resulting from the communication of 
non-public information from one person to another who later ob-
tains a patent. 
 
 
101. See Section–by-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 130 
CONG. REC. H10525 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5833 (emphasis 
added). 
102. Id. at 5834 (emphasis added). 
103. Id. at 5834. (emphasis added). 
104. Id. at 5833. 
